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The Optimal Pricing of Pollution When Enforcement is Costly 
 
Abstract:  We consider the pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant when enforcement is costly 
with a model of optimal, possibly firm-specific, emissions taxes and their enforcement. We argue 
that optimality requires an enforcement strategy that induces full compliance by every firm. This 
holds whether or not regulators have complete information about firms’ abatement costs, the 
costs of monitoring them for compliance, or the costs of collecting penalties from noncompliant 
firms. Moreover, ignoring several unrealistic special cases, optimality requires discriminatory 
emissions taxes except when regulators are unable to observe firms’ abatement costs, the costs of 
monitoring individual firms, or any firm-specific characteristic that is known to be jointly 
distributed with either the firms’ abatement costs or their monitoring costs. In many pollution 
control settings, especially those that have been subject to various forms of environmental 
regulation in the past, regulators are not likely to be so ill-informed about individual firms. In 
these settings, policies that set or generate a uniform pollution price like conventional designs 
involving uniform taxes and competitive emission trading with freely-allocated or auctioned 
permits will not be efficient. 
 
Keywords: Compliance, Enforcement, Emissions Taxes, Monitoring, Asymmetric Information, 
Uncertainty 
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The Optimal Pricing of Pollution When Enforcement is Costly 
 
1. Introduction 
In a first-best world of environmental policy, an optimal tax to control emissions of a uniformly 
mixed pollutant involves a uniform per unit tax set equal to marginal damage from emissions at 
the efficient level of aggregate emissions. Alternatively, a competitive emissions trading 
program with either freely-allocated or auctioned permits will generate a uniform price for 
pollution that is the same as the first-best tax.  In a first-best world, however, regulations do not 
have to be enforced and regulators have complete information about all the benefits and costs of 
pollution control.  These assumptions are always violated in real world applications. In this 
paper, therefore, we consider the optimal pricing of pollution when compliance must be enforced 
and regulators may have only incomplete information about firms’ costs of controlling their 
emissions and the costs of regulatory enforcement. The model is cast as the joint determination 
of optimal, possibly firm-specific, emissions taxes and their enforcement.  
We demonstrate two new results with significant policy relevance. First, under a constant 
expected marginal penalty for tax evasion and the assumption that collecting tax revenue from 
compliant firms is cheaper than collecting penalties from noncompliant firms, the optimal policy 
requires sufficient enforcement effort to induce full compliance by all firms. This is true even 
when regulators have only incomplete information about firms’ abatement costs and the costs of 
enforcement. In the theoretical literature on compliance with emissions taxes most authors 
simply assume that full compliance is not or can not be achieved (e.g., Harford 1978, 1987; 
Sandmo 2002, Montero 2002, Cremer and Gahvari 2002, and Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo 
2006). This is also true in most theoretical analyses of the compliance and enforcement problem 
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in emissions trading schemes (e.g., Malik 1990, Keeler 1991, Stranlund and Dhanda 1999, 
Montero 2002).
1 Without downplaying the relevance of examining incentive-based policies 
when enforcement is not sufficient to induce full compliance, our work suggests that these 
situations involve sub-optimal policy designs.  
Our second main result is that, except for unrealistic special cases, discriminatory taxes 
are optimal except when regulators are unable to observe firms’ abatement costs, the costs of 
monitoring individual firms for compliance, or any firm-specific characteristic (e.g., input and 
output levels, production and abatement technologies, etc.) that is known to be jointly distributed 
with either the firms’ abatement costs or their monitoring costs. In this case, a regulator is unable 
to distinguish firms from one another and, therefore, is unable to determine discriminatory tax 
rates. However, in many situations, perhaps even most situations, regulators will not be so ill-
informed.  In most real settings, particularly in developed countries, firms have been subject to 
some form of pollution control for many years. Consequently, regulators have prior experience 
with and knowledge about the firms that can be used to construct an optimal policy. For 
example, past experience is likely to have provided regulators with information about the costs 
of monitoring different firms. Moreover, past experience may have allowed regulators to 
determine how observable firm characteristics like output, levels and kinds of inputs, abatement 
and production technologies, etc., are jointly distributed with their abatement or monitoring 
costs. We demonstrate that with this type of information, even though it may be incomplete, 
optimality requires discriminatory pollution prices.  
                                                 
1 Still others in this literature restrict themselves to only full compliance outcomes (Malik 1992, Stranlund and 
Chavez 2000, Chavez and Stranlund 2003).  Only Stranlund (2006) considers the optimal design of emission trading 
policies with costly enforcement. He demonstrates that when regulators are fully informed about firms’ costs of 
controlling their emissions the optimal policy calls for inducing full compliance.  
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An important consequence of our work is that when regulators have enough information 
to distinguish firms from one another in a meaningful way, any emissions control policy that sets 
or generates a uniform price cannot be optimal. In particular, conventional designs involving 
uniform tax rates as well as competitive emissions trading with freely-allocated or auctioned 
permits cannot be fully efficient.   
  While our result that enforcement costs will typically call for discriminatory pollution 
prices is not widely known, we do not claim that it is entirely new.
2  Cremer and Gahvari (2002), 
examine the optimal design of an emissions tax policy for homogeneous firms under the 
assumptions of costly enforcement and that tax revenue is used to offset other taxes in an 
economy. While they obviously obtain an optimal uniform tax for a particular industry because 
of their assumption of identical firms within the industry, they also recognize that the tax rate 
will be different in other industries in part because of differences in marginal enforcement costs 
and abatement costs. One could easily use their results to argue that discriminatory taxes are 
likely to be optimal in an industry composed of heterogeneous firms.  
Our work differs from Cremer and Gahvari’s in several important ways. First, while they 
determine optimal taxes and their enforcement jointly as we do, they limit their analysis to 
policies that generate positive violations by all firms. In contrast, we argue that the optimal 
policy should induce full compliance, which suggests that Cremer and Gahvari limited 
themselves to policies that are, in fact, sub-optimal. The second important difference between 
our work and Cremer and Gahvari’s is that they assume complete information about firms’ 
abatement and enforcement costs throughout their work, while we investigate the extent to which 
                                                 
2 Beyond the control of uniformly mixed pollutants from point sources, which is the setting for this work as well as 
all of the literature we discuss, it is well known that discriminatory emissions taxes are optimal when pollutants are 
spatially differentiated (see Xepapadeas (1997), chapter 2 section 8 for references, including zonal taxes) and when 
emissions are generated by nonpoint sources (e.g., Segerson 1988).  
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discriminatory taxes remain optimal when regulators have incomplete information about 
abatement and enforcement costs.
3 Finally, Cremer and Gahvari (2002) also investigate how 
recycling emissions tax revenue to reduce other taxes in an economy affects optimal emissions 
taxes. In contrast, we assume that tax revenue is not used to offset other taxes in order to focus 
on the roles of costly enforcement and incomplete information in determining optimal pollution 
prices.  
  Malik (1992) provides an early hint that policies that generate a uniform pollution price 
are likely to be sub-optimal when one accounts for enforcement costs. Malik models a 
competitive emissions trading program under complete information that is enforced to achieve 
full compliance and demonstrates that even though the permit market leads to a distribution of 
emission control that minimizes aggregate abatement costs, it does not minimize the sum of 
aggregate abatement and enforcement costs.  An important distinction between our work and 
Malik’s is that he is concerned with the optimal distribution of emissions while we are concerned 
with the optimal distribution of emissions prices. The two approaches are obviously 
complementary, but our pricing approach is instructive because it illuminates what we believe is 
the fundamental reason for the sub-optimality of emissions trading that Malik identifies; that is, a 
competitive emissions trading policy leads to a uniform price, while enforcement costs typically 
call for discriminatory prices.  
  Our model differs from Malik’s in other important ways as well. First, he simply assumes 
that regulators devote sufficient enforcement resources to induce full compliance in an emission 
                                                 
3 In a recent contribution, Bontems and Bourgeon (2005) consider optimal environmental taxes under incomplete 
information and costly enforcement. They take a standard revelation approach that relies on eliciting truthful reports 
by firms of their “types”. (See Lewis (1996) for a review of this approach.) In their work, a policy consists of a type-
specific lump sum tax, an emissions standard, a monitoring probability, and a fine for violating the standard. This is 
very different from the way environmental economists and policymakers usually think of emissions taxes. Emissions 
taxes are usually per unit taxes, no restrictions are placed on firms’ emissions, and noncompliance occurs if a firm 
attempts to evade its tax liability by under-reporting its emissions.  
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trading program, while we demonstrate that inducing full compliance to a tax regulation is 
optimal. Second, like Cremer and Gahvari (2002), Malik (1992) assumes complete information 
throughout his work, while we consider optimal pollution pricing when regulators have only 
incomplete information.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section we develop a model of 
compliance behavior under emissions taxes. In section 3, we lay out the components of the costs 
of enforcing a policy of emissions taxes, which include the costs of monitoring firms, and the 
expected costs of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms. We then demonstrate that an 
optimal tax policy must induce full compliance by every firm, even when a regulator has only 
incomplete information about firms’ abatement costs and the costs of enforcement. In section 4 
we use our full-compliance result to determine optimal emissions taxes. The optimal design will 
typically involve discriminatory taxes except when a regulator has rather poor information about 
firms’ abatement and monitoring costs. In fact, we specify the exact limit on the quality of the 
regulator’s information at which it becomes optimal to set a uniform tax. We discuss this 
interpretation as well as other implications of our results in section 5, and conclude in section 6.   
 
2. Compliance behavior under emissions taxes 
The regulatory model of this paper is the standard one in which a regulator first commits itself to 
a tax policy and its enforcement and then the regulated firms react to this policy with their 
choices of emissions and compliance. In this section we determine the firms’ responses to any 
tax/enforcement policy.  
  Throughout consider a fixed set N of heterogeneous risk-neutral firms. These firms may 
or may not belong to the same industry, but each emits the same uniformly mixed pollutant.  A 
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summary of the costs of all the methods firm i can use to reduce its emissions is given by its 
abatement cost function, Ci(qi), which is strictly decreasing and strictly convex in its emissions 
qi.
4 The firm’s emissions are taxed at rate ti. The firm is required to submit a report of its 
emissions,  , and it is noncompliant if it attempts to evade some part of its tax liability by 
reporting  .  
i r
i i q r <
  The regulator cannot observe the firm’s emissions without a costly audit. Let  i π  denote 
the probability that the regulator is able to determine i’s compliance status. Like most other 
authors, we assume that monitoring produces a measure of emissions that is accurate enough to 
judge a firm’s compliance status without error. The detection probability is common knowledge 
and the regulator commits itself to it at the outset. If monitoring reveals that i has under-reported 
its emissions, it faces a unit penalty of φ  on   0 > − i i r q .
5 We assume that  i t φ >  throughout. This 
allows full compliance to be a possible outcome throughout the paper. No upper bound is placed 
on φ , because none of our results depend on setting arbitrarily high penalties. 
  To simplify our analysis we restrict it to policies that motivate all firms to reduce their 
emissions below what they would chose in the absence of any sort of regulatory control, but that 
do not cause any firm to choose zero emissions. Under these policies firm i chooses it emissions 
and emissions report to solve: 
         [ 1 ]     
. 0 , 0 . .




i i i i i i i r q
r r q t s
r q r t q C
i i φ π
                                                 
4 A firm’s abatement cost is the reduction in its profit that comes from reducing its emissions below what it would 
choose in the absence of an inducement to control its emissions (Montgomery 1972). 
5 Our assumption of a linear penalty function is not common in the literature. Most authors assume that the penalty 
function, or at least the expected penalty function, is strictly convex (e.g., Harford 1978, 1987; Sandmo 2002, 
Cremer and Gahvari 2002, and Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo 2006). We briefly address the use of linear 
penalties vs. convex penalties in the next section. 
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Restricting the firm to  follows from the fact that a firm will never have an incentive to 
report that its emissions are higher than they really are.
0 ≥ − i i r q
6  Let   denote the Lagrange equation for 
[1] and let 
L
i λ  denote the multiplier attached to the constraint  0 ≥ − i i r q .  Then, the following 
first-order conditions are both necessary and sufficient to determine the firm’s optimal choices of 
emissions and emissions report:  
   () 0 ; qi i i i Cq π φλ ′ =+ − = L        [ 2 ]  
0, 0,  ( ) 0; r i i iii i i i tr r t   π φλ π φβ =− + ≥ ≥ − + = L     [ 3 ]  
   ( ) 0,  0,  ( ) 0. ii i i ii qr qr λ λ λ =− − ≤ ≥ − = L      [ 4 ]  
  Making the common assumption that a firm will comply if it is indifferent between 
compliance and noncompliance, [3] reveals that a firm’s optimal emissions report is: 
















Thus, the firm provides a truthful report of its emissions when the tax does not exceed the 
expected marginal penalty. When the tax does exceed the expected marginal penalty, it is 
cheaper for the firm to report zero emissions and face the expected penalty than to pay the tax. 
 When φ πi i t ≤  so that the firm is motivated to report its emissions truthfully, [3] becomes 
ii t i π φλ =− . Combining this with [2] yields the familiar result that the firm chooses its emissions 
to equate its marginal abatement cost to the tax, that is,  . 0 ) ( = + ′ i i i t q C  However, when  φ πi i t >  
and the firm under-reports its emissions, [4] indicates that  0 i λ = ,  and [2] becomes 
() 0 ii i Cq π φ ′ += , indicating that a noncompliant firms chooses its emissions to equate its 
                                                 
6 If   , then the firm could reduce its abatement costs by allowing its emissions to increase to r i i r q < i without 
incurring additional costs.   
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marginal abatement cost to the expected marginal penalty it faces. Thus, a firm’s optimal choice 





> = + ′
≤ = + ′
=
. if , 0 ) ( ) (
if , 0 ) ( ) (
φ π φ π φ π
φ π
i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i
i t q C q
t t q C t q
q            [6] 
  Since we assume that an optimal tax/enforcement policy is designed under incomplete 
information about firms’ abatement costs, it is worthwhile at this point to specify what a 
regulator can and cannot know about firm behavior. Although a regulator knows how firms will 
choose their emissions in response to a tax and enforcement strategy, it cannot know exactly 
what a firm’s emissions will be because it lacks complete information about its abatement costs. 
Moreover, if the regulator chooses not to induce compliance by a firm, it is uncertain about the 
extent of the firm’s violation because this depends on the firm’s choice of emissions. However, 
since the regulator controls the variables that fully determine a firm’s compliance status; i.e., the 
tax and the expected marginal penalty, the regulator does know whether a firm will be compliant 
or not.  
 
3. The costs of enforcing emissions taxes and the optimality of full compliance  
The regulatory objective of this paper is to choose a system of individualized emissions taxes 
and enforcement strategies to minimize the expected social costs of the regulation. These costs 
include the regulator’s expectations of aggregate abatement costs, pollution damage, and 
enforcement costs.  In this section we focus on expected enforcement costs, which consist of the 
regulator’s expectations of aggregate monitoring costs and the costs of collecting penalties from 
noncompliant firms. Under the assumption that collecting tax revenue from compliant firms is 
cheaper than collecting penalties from noncompliant firms, we state and prove a sort of  “cost-
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effective enforcement” result. More specifically, we ask how a tax/enforcement policy should be 
designed to minimize the expected enforcement costs of inducing an arbitrary, fixed, and likely 
unknown set of individual emissions, and show that a policy that minimizes expected 
enforcement costs requires that each individual firm’s tax be equal to the expected marginal 
penalty it faces. Consequently, all firms are fully compliant. In the next section we incorporate 
this “cost-effective enforcement” result into the determination of taxes that result in the optimal 
distribution of individual emissions.   
  The unit penalty for evaded taxes is fixed throughout this paper, so the regulator’s policy 
instruments are individual taxes and detection probabilities, ( , ) ii t π , i = 1, … , n, which induce 
emissions reports and emissions, (ri , qi), i = 1, … , n, according to [5] and [6], respectively.  
Assume that the actual cost of monitoring firm i is the increasing and convex function  ( ) ii m π , 
and aggregate monitoring costs are  ( ) ii N m π ∑ . The regulator does not have complete 
information about monitoring costs because it is not certain of the parameters of  , i = 1, … , n. 
We allow the costs of monitoring the firms to vary to reflect the possibility that the regulator will 
find it harder to determine the compliance status of some firms than others.
i m
7  The linearity of 
aggregate monitoring costs in individual monitoring costs is not essential. To obtain the results 
of this paper it is sufficient to assume that aggregate monitoring costs are increasing and convex 
in the individual detection probabilities.  
  We assume throughout that tax revenue and revenue from penalizing noncompliant firms 
are simple transfers with no real effects. Despite this, society is not indifferent about collecting 
them; in particular, penalizing noncompliant firms may involve significant costs. These include 
                                                 
7 This assumption is closely related to the assumption that individuals vary in their probabilities of apprehension, 
which was first analyzed by Bebchuk and Kaplow (1993). Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2006) assume 
heterogeneous probabilities of apprehension in their study of enforcing emissions taxes. 
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the government’s costs of generating sufficient evidence to get a court to agree with their finding 
of violation and the imposition of a penalty. Moreover, accused firms may mount costly 
challenges to any finding of violation and the imposition of a penalty, to which the government 
may then respond with its own costly efforts to fight off these challenges.
8 On the other hand, a 
compliant firm reports the full extent of its emissions, and in doing so, essentially admits liability 
for these emissions. With this admission of liability, the government does not need to generate 
the evidence that would be necessary to impose a penalty for noncompliance. Moreover, a firm 
that admits its liability is not likely to challenge the imposition of the tax.   
  Therefore, we think that it is reasonable to assume that imposing and collecting penalties 
from noncompliant firms is more costly that collecting taxes from compliant firms, and 
incorporate this assumption into our model.  To do so in a simply way, suppose that collecting 
emissions taxes is costless, but that   is the cost of collecting the penalty from firm i if it is 
caught evading its tax liability. Although   may be a function of the size of the firm’s penalty, 
our results do not depend on specifying such a relationship. Let the aggregate expected costs of 
collecting penalties be linear in the costs of collecting penalties from individual firms. If 
denotes the subset of firms that are noncompliant, the aggregate expected costs of collecting 
penalties are 
0 i s >
i s
nc N
nc ii N s π ∑ . As with aggregate monitoring costs, the linearity of aggregate expected 
sanctioning costs is not essential. For our results it is sufficient to assume that aggregate expected 
sanctioning costs are montonically increasing in the costs of sanctioning individual firms. 
                                                 
8 Although it is perfectly reasonable to assume that penalizing firms is costly, none of the work in the literature on 
enforcing emissions taxes that we are aware of deals explicitly with the costs of collecting penalties.  In the literature 
on enforcing emissions trading policies, only Stranlund (2006) assumes that imposing and collecting penalties is 
costly. Costly sanctions are also not very common in the much larger literature on optimal law enforcement; 
however, see Polinsky and Shavell (1992) for an analysis of how costly sanctions affect the determination of optimal 
law enforcement.  
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Finally, like the cost of monitoring individual firms, the regulator need not have complete 
information about the cost of collecting penalties from individual firms.
9
  Despite our rather weak assumptions about the expected costs of enforcing emissions 
taxes, we are able to prove the following proposition concerning the optimal enforcement of 
these policies.  
 
Proposition 1: Consider a tax/monitoring policy, ( , ) ii t π , i = 1, … , n, and an exogenous 
constant marginal penalty that satisfies  i t φ > , i = 1, … , n. Suppose that firms react to this policy 
with emissions qi, i = 1, … , n. This distribution of emissions is achieved with minimum 
expected aggregate enforcement costs only if  ii t π φ =  for each i = 1, … , n. With taxes and 
monitoring set in this way, each firm is fully compliant.  
 
Proof: The proof proceeds by showing that any policy involving  ii t π φ ≠  for some i can be 
modified to reduce enforcement costs without changing the distribution of emissions. First 
suppose that  ii t π φ >  for some i.  Then, [5] indicates that ri = 0, and [6] indicates that 
) ( φ π i i i q q = ; that is the firm is fully noncompliant. Alternatively, hold  i π  constant so that 
aggregate monitoring costs do not change, but reduce ti so that  ii t π φ = .  The firm will then 
choose ) ( φ π i i i q r =  so that it is now compliant, but it does not change it emissions because 
) ( ) ( i i i i t q q = φ π . Moreover, changing   in this way does not affect the decisions of any of the  i t
                                                 
9 Any enforcement strategy is likely to involve fixed monitoring costs and sanctioning costs, which we do not 
model. Adding these fixed costs does not change any of the results of our work as long as they are not so high that it 
is optimal to forego regulation altogether.  
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other firms. However, reducing   to  i t ii t π φ =  eliminates the expected costs of penalizing the 
firm; hence, aggregate expected enforcement costs are reduced. 
  Now suppose that  ii t π φ <  for some i. In this case, [5] and [6] reveal that  ; that 
is, the firm is compliant. However, if 
) ( i i i t q r =
i π  is reduced so that  ii t π φ = , the firm does not change its 
choice of emissions and it remains compliant. This change in  i π  does not affect the decisions of 
the other firms, but aggregate expected enforcement costs are reduced because expected 
monitoring costs decrease. QED. 
 
  It is important to note that the proposition holds even if a regulator is uncertain about 
firms’ abatement costs. Of course, uncertainty about abatement costs implies that the regulator 
cannot be certain about the distribution of individual emissions that will result from a particular 
policy, ( , ) ii t π , i = 1, … , n, but the proposition does not depend on knowing how individual 
emissions are distributed. Whatever qi, i = 1, … , n, results from a particular policy, the expected 
enforcement costs of holding the firms to this distribution of emissions are minimized by 
choosing  ii t π φ = , i = 1, … , n. Moreover, the proposition holds even if the regulator is uncertain 
about the parameters of enforcement costs. All the regulator has to know is that expected 
aggregate monitoring costs are increasing in individual monitoring levels, and expected 
aggregate sanctioning costs are increasing in the costs of penalizing individual firms.   Because 
the strategy  ii t π φ = , i = 1, … , n, minimizes the expected enforcement costs of inducing a fixed 
set of individual emissions, we shall incorporate this strategy into our determination of optimal 
taxes and their enforcement in the next section. 
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  That this strategy induces full compliance by each firm is a new result with significant 
relevance for the determination of optimal emissions taxes. As noted in the introduction, the 
related literature has not dealt squarely with the possibility that inducing full compliance may be 
a component of an optimal tax policy. For example, Montero (2002), in his study of price vs. 
quantity regulation with costly enforcement, explicitly assumes that monitoring costs are large 
enough and penalties are restricted enough so that full compliance is not socially optimal (page 
439). Although the unit penalty is not restricted in our work, all that is required is that it exceed 
each firm’s tax rate. Given this assumption, optimality requires full compliance regardless of 
monitoring costs. To be sure, monitoring costs will affect the optimal tax rates, but they do not 
affect the decision to induce full compliance.   
  Similarly, but not as explicitly, Cremer and Gahvari’s (2002) work is clearly focused on 
optimal taxes and their enforcement in situations involving less than full compliance. They 
simply sidestep the possibility that optimality may call for full compliance by ignoring the 
natural zero-boundary constraint on firms’ unreported emissions. Instead they assume that firms’ 
choices of unreported emissions are always interior choices (see their first-order condition for an 
emissions report, (8a) on page 391).  Our proposition suggests that Cremer and Gahvari may 
have limited themselves unnecessarily to suboptimal enforcement strategies.  
  Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2006) also focus solely on imperfect compliance by 
assuming a constant emissions tax and the regulatory objective of minimizing aggregate 
emissions with a fixed enforcement budget that is not sufficient to induce full compliance.
10 
While limited enforcement resources are certainly a factor in many real instances of 
                                                 
10 Garvie and Keeler (1994) examine the choices of a budget-constrained enforcer under emissions standards, while 
Stranlund and Dhanda (1999) do the same in the context of competitive emissions trading.  
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environmental policy enforcement, our proposition suggests that in designing a truly optimal tax 
policy regulators should allocate sufficient enforcement resources to achieve full compliance. 
  The focus on positive violation choices by Cremer and Gahvari (2002), Macho-Stadler 
and Perez-Castrillo (2006), and several others (e.g., Harford (1978 and 1987) and Sandmo 
(2002)), is accomplished, in part, with the assumption that expected penalty functions are strictly 
convex. We know of no empirical justification for this assumption, nor are we aware of any 
efficiency reason to prefer strictly convex expected penalty functions for tax evasion to linear 
expected penalty functions.
11 Moreover, expected penalties are strictly convex either because 
monitoring probabilities or penalties are strictly convex in unreported emissions. The first case 
involves a questionable assumption because a regulator’s monitoring activity would then depend 
on actual violations: but, of course, a firm’s violation cannot be known until it is monitored. If 
monitoring probabilities are independent of unreported emissions, then strict convexity of the 
expected penalty function comes from marginal penalties that are increasing in violation levels. 
We are not aware of any tax policy that specifies an increasing marginal penalty. On the other 
hand, a constant marginal penalty is a very natural choice of penalty because the marginal 
incentive to evade the tax is the constant tax rate. 
Our reading of the literature suggests that the primary justification for strictly convex 
expected penalties is to allow analysts to focus on situations involving positive violations. In 
contrast, we assume that the expected marginal penalty function is linear, which forces us to take 
the boundary condition of zero violations seriously, and ultimately leads us to the optimality of 
inducing full compliance.   While our choice to model constant expected marginal penalties is 
one reason we find that inducing full compliance is optimal, it is not the only reason. Our 
                                                 
11 Although, for a competitive emissions trading program that seeks to achieve an aggregate emissions target cost-
effectively, Stranlund (2006) demonstrates that a linear penalty and monitoring to induce full compliance is 
preferred to a strictly convex penalty and monitoring that allows noncompliance.   
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assumption that it is costly to collect penalties from noncompliant firms is crucial. In fact, the 
fundamental value of inducing full compliance is to avoid these costs.  
 
4. Optimal emission taxes under incomplete information 
Having characterized an optimal enforcement strategy, we incorporate this strategy into the 
determination of optimal taxes when a regulator has only incomplete information about firms’ 
abatement costs and the costs of monitoring them for compliance. The focus of our analysis is on 
whether an optimal tax policy involves discriminatory taxes or whether a regulator should set a 
single tax that applies uniformly to all firms. Clearly, if a regulator’s information about 
individual firms is so poor that it is unable to distinguish them from one another in a meaningful 
way, it has no basis for choosing discriminatory taxes. While such poor information may be 
characteristic of some pollution control settings, it certainly is not a universal feature. In fact, we 
suspect that in many situations, particularly those in which firms have been subject to control 
policies in the past, regulators can probably observe individual firm characteristics, like output, 
inputs, abatement equipment, and production technologies, that provide some information about 
their unknown abatement and monitoring cost parameters. For example, past experience may 
have provided regulators with a great deal of information about the difficulty of monitoring the 
emissions from different firms. Perhaps they know that larger facilities with more points of 
discharge are harder to monitor than smaller facilities. Regulators may have also learned that 
certain kinds of abatement and production technologies make monitoring more or less difficult 
than other technologies. Past experience may have also allowed regulators to derive estimates of 
the parameters of firms’ abatement costs as functions of observable firm characteristics.  
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  Consequently, we let xi denote a vector of observable characteristics of firm i, and 
assume that a regulator knows that these characteristics are jointly distributed with the 
parameters of the firms’ abatement and monitoring costs in the population of regulated firms. 
Knowledge of the joint distribution of the firms’ cost parameters and at least some of their 
observable characteristics allows the regulator to form a joint probability density function of the 
unknown cost parameters for each firm that is conditioned on the firm’s observable 
characteristics.  The regulator can then use these conditional distributions to determine optimal 
individual tax rates and their enforcement.  This policy is determined to maximize the regulator’s 
conditional expectation of the sum of aggregate abatement costs, aggregate monitoring costs, and 
the damage from the firms’ emissions.  
  First consider expected abatement costs.  Let the conditional expectation of firm i’s 
abatement cost function be  , where E denotes the expectation operator throughout. 
Recall from Proposition 1 that it is optimal to set a firm’s tax equal to its expected marginal 
penalty 
( () | ii i ECq x )
( ) ii t π φ =  so that it is compliant, and from [6], a firm will then choose its emissions so 
that its marginal abatement cost is equal to the tax rate.  Therefore, the regulator’s conditional 
expectation of the firm’s choice of emissions under the tax   is   i t
    () ( ) () | | ( ) | ii i i i i i i Eqt x q ECq x t ′ =− = .   [7] 
Using [7], the regulator can specify its conditional expectation of the firm’s abatement costs in 
terms of the tax;  
    () ( ) () | ( () ) | ii i i ii i ECt x ECqt x = .      [ 8 ]  
Then, given the regulator’s observations of all xi, i = 1, …, n, its conditional expectation of the 
aggregate abatement costs generated by its tax policy ti, i = 1, …, n, is 
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    .        [ 9 ]   ( () | ii ECt x ∑ )
From here on, summations are over all regulated firms. 
  The marginal effect of changing a single tax, ti, on the regulator’s conditional expectation 
of aggregate abatement costs is simply the marginal effect on the regulator’s expectation of the 
abatement costs of that firm.   From [8] this effect is  ( ) () () ) | ii ii ECqqt x ′′ . Since the regulator 
knows the firm will choose its emissions so that  ( ) ii i Cq t ′ − = ,  
     () ()
() |




dE C t x
tE q t x
dt
′ = −>     [10] 
The sign of [10] follows because the regulator’s conditional expectation of the firm’s marginal 
emissions response to a change in its tax is negative. That is, from [7],  
    () ( ) () | 1 / ( ) | 0 ii i i i i Eqt x E Cq x ′′ ′ =− < .      [ 1 1 ]  
  Like the firms’ abatement costs the regulator is uncertain about the costs of monitoring 
individual firms for compliance, but it can evaluate the conditional expectations of the firms’ 
monitoring costs. For firm i this is  ( ) () | ii i Em x π . Since optimal enforcement requires  ii t π φ = , 
the regulator’s expectation of the cost of monitoring i in terms of the tax is  , and 
its expectation of how the cost of monitoring i changes with t
() (/) | ii i Emt x φ
i is 
    () ( ) (/) | () |
0
ii i i i i
i





= > .    [12] 
The regulator’s expectation of the monitoring cost of maintaining compliance by the firm 
increases with its tax to offset the firm’s increased incentive to evade a higher tax. Given the 
regulator’s observations of xi, i = 1, …, n, its conditional expectation of aggregate monitoring 
costs in terms of its tax policy ti, i = 1, …, n, is 
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    .        [ 1 3 ]   ( (/) | ii i Emt x φ ∑ )
)
The marginal affect on the regulator’s conditional expectation of aggregate monitoring costs of a 
change in a single tax, ti, is given by [12]. 
  Lastly, the regulator must evaluate how its policy affects its conditional expectation of 
pollution damage. We assume that the firms’ emissions are uniformly mixed so damage is an 
increasing and convex function, D, of aggregate emissions. For simplicity, suppose that the 
regulator knows the damage function; however, it remains uncertain about how much damage its 
policy will produce, because it is uncertain about how each firm will respond to its tax. It does, 
however, know the conditional expectation of how each firm will respond,  , i = 1, 
…, n, so pollution damage at the regulator’s conditional expectation of aggregate emissions is,  
() () | ii i Eqt x
    .        [ 1 4 ]   ( (( ) |) ii i DE q t x ∑
The regulator’s conditional expectation of the change in damage from a change in the tax on firm 
i is 
   () ( ) (( ) |) ( ) | 0 ii i ii i DE q t x E q t x ′′ < ∑ .       [ 1 5 ]  
We now have all the components of social costs. Let  11 (, , , , ) n Wt t x x …… n  denote the 
regulator’s expectation of social costs in terms of a policy of well-enforced individual emissions 
taxes, ti, i = 1, …, n, conditional on its observations of xi, i = 1, …, n. Note that 




11 (, , , , ) () | (/) |
(( ) |) .
nn i i i i
ii i
Wt t x x ECt x Emt x






    [16]   
Suppose that  11 (, , , , ) n Wt t x x …… n  is strictly convex in ti, i = 1, …, n, for all possible realizations 
of xi, i = 1, …, n, and that an optimal policy involves strictly positive individual taxes. Then, the 
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optimal tax rates are determined by  / 0, i Wt ∂ ∂=  i = 1, …, n.  Since  / i Wt ∂ ∂  is equal to the sum 
of [10], [12], and [15], the first-order conditions for the optimal taxes can be written as:  
() () () (
() |
( ))| ( ( )| ) ( )|
ii i
ii ii i i i i i i
Em x




′′ −+= − ∑ ′ , i = 1, …, n.  [17] 
The left-hand side of [17] for a particular firm i is the regulator’s expectation of the marginal 
costs of increasing the firm’s tax, which consists of the impact of the increased tax on the 
regulator’s expectation of the firm’s abatement costs and on its expectation of the costs of 
monitoring the firm. The right hand-side is the regulator’s expectation of the marginal reduction 
in aggregate damage from increasing i’s tax.  
  Now, take any two firms, i and j, and use [17] to calculate 




() | () | 1
.
() | () |
jj j ii i
ij
ii i jj j
Em x Em x
tt





⎜ ′ ′ ⎝⎠
⎟
⎟
     [ 1 8 ]  
Our last proposition follows directly from [18], so it is offered without formal proof. 
 
Proposition 2: An optimal policy of emissions taxes under incomplete information about firms’ 
abatement and monitoring costs involves discriminatory taxes if and only if 
() ( ) () | ( ) | ii i i i Em x Eqt x π ′′ i () ( ) () | ( ) | jj j j j j Em x Eqt x π ′′ ≠  for some i and j. 
 
5. Discussion of Proposition 2 
Proposition 2 reveals the condition under which enforcement costs induce optimal discriminatory 
taxes and, in doing so, helps us specify conditions that would lead to a uniform tax.  Several of 
the conditions that induce a single tax rate are quite unrealistic. For example a uniform tax will 
be optimal if the firms’ marginal monitoring costs and their marginal emissions responses to 
taxation are the same. This is true as well if the firms’ observable characteristics are all the same. 
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Another unrealistic possibility is that the firms’ marginal monitoring costs are all zero. In this 
case, [17] reduces to  , which is the familiar result that optimality requires 
a uniform tax that is set equal to marginal damage at the efficient level of the regulator’s 
expectation of aggregate emissions.
( (( ) |) ii i tD E q tx ′ = ∑ ) i
                                                
12  
However, it seems to us that the most relevant condition under which a uniform tax is 
optimal is when a regulator is unable to observe any firm characteristic that it knows to be jointly 
distributed with the parameters of the firms’ abatement and monitoring costs. In this case the 
regulator’s expectations of the firms’ marginal monitoring costs and emissions responses are the 
same, because it has no way to distinguish the firms from one another. Thus, we would argue 
that the fundamental justification for setting a uniform tax to control a uniformly mixed pollutant 
is that a regulator has very poor information about individual firms.
13  
As we’ve already noted, we do not believe regulators will be so ill-informed in many real 
settings. When a regulator has somewhat better, but still incomplete, information about 
individual firms, [18] indicates that their tax rates will vary except in unrealistic special cases. 
Admittedly, the number of distinct optimal tax rates may be small if a regulator has only coarse 
information about individual firms. For example, suppose that a control situation involves the 
firms from a number of industries, and that the regulator knows something about how monitoring 
or abatement costs differ across the industries, but is unable to distinguish firms within particular 
industries. In this case, the number of distinct tax rates may simply be equal to the number of 
 
12 With [17] it is straightforward to demonstrate that costly enforcement generally implies that individual tax rates 
are below marginal damage. Consequently, individual and aggregate emissions are higher than if enforcement was 
costless. 
13 We recognize, however, that even when regulators have sufficient information to impose discriminatory taxes, 
other considerations may limit their ability to do so. Legal prohibitions against discriminatory taxation may prevent 
regulators from implementing a fully optimal tax policy. Even if discriminatory taxes are lawful, they may not be 
politically feasible. In all likelihood some firms will perceive discriminatory taxes as unfair and lobby against their 
use. Successful lobbying efforts could lead to a uniform tax when discriminatory taxes are appropriate.  
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industries involved. Or, imagine a control setting involving the emissions of the firms in a single 
industry that use only a small number of distinct abatement technologies to control their 
emissions. If this piece of information is the only characteristic that a regulator knows is jointly 
distributed with the firms’ abatement or monitoring costs, the number of distinct tax rates may be 
equal to the number of available control technologies. Depending on the degree of heterogeneity 
in the population of regulated firms, more detailed information about each of them may lead to a 
greater number of distinct tax rates.  
When a regulator can distinguish firms from others, their tax rates will vary with the 
variation in () ( ) () | ( ) | ii i i i i Em x Eqt x π ′′ , i = 1, …, n.  Recall from [11] that  () () | ii i Eqt x ′ = 
. Therefore, individual tax rates vary if there is variation in the regulator’s 
conditional expectations of the firms’ marginal monitoring costs, or if there is variation in its 
expectations of the reciprocal of the slopes of their marginal abatement costs, or both. It is 
particularly noteworthy that optimal emissions taxes will likely vary across firms even if the 
marginal cost of monitoring each of them for compliance is the same. Therefore, simply 
recognizing that monitoring is costly will often be sufficient justification for imposing 
discriminatory taxes.   
( 1/ ( )| 0 ii i EC q x ′′ − ) <
Since   and  () () | 0 ii i Eqt x ′ < ( ) () | 0 ii i Em x π ′ > , their ratio is negative. From [18], then, 
 if and only if  i tt < j () ( ) |( ) | ( ) | | ii i i i i Em x Eqt x π ′′ < ( ) ( ) |( ) | ( ) | jj j j j j Em x Eqt x π ′′ |
)
. For firm i,  
() ( () | ( ) | ii i i i i Em x Eqt x π ′′  reflects the regulator’s expectation of the marginal monitoring costs 
associated with inducing lower emissions from the firm with a well-enforced tax. Inducing a 
marginal decrease in the emissions of a firm with a more steeply sloped marginal abatement cost 
curve (i.e., higher  ) requires a relatively greater increase in its tax and, consequently, a  ( ) ii Cq ′′
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relatively greater increase in monitoring to maintain the firm’s compliance. Therefore, to 
conserve monitoring costs, optimal taxes will tend to be lower for firms that the regulator expects 
have relatively steep marginal abatement cost functions.  For the same reason, optimal tax rates 
will tend to be lower for firms that the regulator expects are more difficult to monitor, and hence, 
have higher marginal monitoring cost functions.    
One of the most important implications of Proposition 2 is that, when regulators have 
sufficient information to set discriminatory taxes, any policy that sets or generates a single price 
for pollution cannot be fully efficient. These policies include conventional designs involving 
uniform emissions taxes, or transferable permit programs with freely-given or auctioned permits. 
But it is the single pollution price that drives much of our understanding of price-based control 
and that leads to the most important reason for designing and implementing price-based policies. 
That reason is the ability of these policies to induce a distribution of individual emissions control 
that minimizes the aggregate abatement costs of achieving some aggregate emissions target, even 
when a target cannot be guaranteed because of incomplete information. A single pollution price 
motivates firms to choose emissions so that their marginal abatement costs are equal to the price. 
Since they all face the same price, all of their marginal abatement costs are equal in equilibrium, 
which forms the set of necessary conditions for minimizing aggregate abatement costs. Clearly 
this result requires a uniform pollution price, and just as clearly, when it is optimal to set 
discriminatory prices, aggregate abatement costs will not be minimized. Using our approach it is 
easy to demonstrate that achieving an aggregate emissions target (at least in expectation) with 
lowest possible expected aggregate abatement costs plus expected enforcement costs cannot be 
achieved with a single price—minimizing this sum requires discriminatory prices. 
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6. Conclusion 
We have examined the optimal pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant when enforcement is 
costly and regulators have incomplete information about firms’ abatement costs and the costs of 
enforcement, and have demonstrated two new results. First, an optimal policy calls on regulators 
to devote sufficient enforcement resources to induce full compliance by all firms. This is true 
regardless of the quality of information regulators have about individual firms’ abatement costs 
and the costs of enforcement. Second, enforcement costs will typically induce discriminatory 
pollution prices, except when regulators have very poor information about individual firms. 
More specifically, unrealistic special cases aside, a policy that sets or generates a uniform price 
will be optimal only when regulators are unable to use observable firm characteristics to form 
conditional expectations of individual firm’s abatement costs and the costs of monitoring them 
for compliance.  Although there are certainly pollution control settings in which regulators have 
such poor information, there are many others, particularly those that have been subject to 
environmental controls in the past, in which regulators are likely to have some information that 
allows them to distinguish firms from one another. In these cases, uniform pricing of pollution 
cannot be efficient. 
  There are, of course, several ways to extend the results of our work. For example, given 
the political appeal of emissions trading policies, it is probably worth exploring whether trading 
schemes can be modified in straightforward ways to generate the correct firm-specific prices. 
Modifications to these policies to induce the correct prices may involve permit trading ratios 
among firms that differ from the one-for-one trading schemes that characterize conventional 
emissions trading. Another option might be to combine one-for-one permit trading with firm-
specific taxes to account for differences in the optimal pollution prices.   
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  Reexamining our results in more difficult control situations may also be worthwhile. In 
this work we have focused on the control of uniformly mixed pollutants, largely because this is 
the setting that drives much of what we understand about price-based pollution control. 
Moreover, it is the one setting in which conventional wisdom calls for setting a uniform 
emissions tax, or implementing transferable or auctioned permit schemes that generate a uniform 
permit price. Of course, in contrast to what we perceive to be conventional wisdom, we’ve 
argued that the presence of enforcement costs will typically call for discriminatory pricing of a 
uniformly mixed pollutant. There are other control situations that call for discriminatory pricing, 
even under the assumption of costless enforcement. These include nonpoint pollution problems 
and problems involving spatially-differentiated pollutants. In these cases it is the nature of the 
pollutant that leads to discriminatory pricing. Adding the enforcement dimension to these control 
problems will likely generate two motivations for discriminatory pricing. How enforcement costs 
and the nature of the pollutant interact to determine optimal pollution prices is likely to be a 
fruitful area for future research. 
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